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ERISA PREEMPTION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAw-Francis v. United
Technologies Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. CAL. 1978).
Plaintiff, Sharon Francis, sued for divorce in the Superior Court of
Santa Clara, California. Seeking her alleged community property interest
in her husband's retirement plan, she joined as defendants her husband's
employer and both the administrator and the trustee of the employer's re-
tirement plan. After removing the case to the Federal District Court for
the Northern District of California, defendants moved for summary judg-
ment. They asserted that the federal Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act' (ERISA) preempted state law purporting to award a community
property interest in a private pension plan to the non-employee spouse at
dissolution. Granting summary judgment, the court in Francis v. United
Technologies Corp.2 held that ERISA preempts state community property
law insofar as it recognizes a property interest of the non-employee
spouse in the pension.
Courts in both California and Washington recognize a community
property interest in pension plans at dissolution. 3 Consequently, under the
Francis interpretation, ERISA would have preemptive effects in Wash-
ington similar to those in California. The California court by statute must
distribute half the community property to each spouse, 4 while the Wash-
ington court need only effectuate a "just and equitable" distribution of all
property. 5 Despite the broader power of the Washington courts, the other
property may be insufficient to compensate for the lost community inter-
est in the pension and, following the Francis rationale, a court might even
be required to disregard the pension entirely, precluding any offsetting
award of property. 6
The theory of modem domestic relations law-marriage as partner-
shipT7-requires recognition of the non-employee spouse's ownership in-
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976). For a full presentation of ERISA's evolution, see SENATE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR, 94TH CONG., 2D. SESS. (1976), LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OFTHE EMPLOYEE RETIRE-
MENT INCOME SECURITY Act OF 1974, reprinted in [1976] CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE at S
542-13-14-15.
2. 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (Poole, J.).
3. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633,544 P.2d 561 (1976); Payne v.
Payne, 82 Wn. 2d 573,512 P.2d 736 (1973); DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wn. App. 741,491 P.2d 249
(1971).
4. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West 1970).
5. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (1979).
6. See note 71 infra.
7. See note 10 infra.
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terest in the pension. This note challenges the Francis court's finding that
recognition of the non-employee spouse's ownership interest was
preempted by ERISA, 8 concluding that Congress did not intend to bring
about the regression in domestic relations law that Francis threatens.
I. BACKGROUND
A. State Community Property Characterization of Pension Benefits
Traditionally, federal courts have treated state domestic relations law
with great deference, and have viewed interests in family property as a
concern of local law. 9 Thus a state is free to choose a system of commu-
nity property ownership which resembles a partnership. Community
property law generally presumes that each spouse's contribution to the
community is equal and, therefore, each spouse possesses an equal right
to succeed to all property acquired during the marriage by the labor of
either. ' 0 Thus pension benefits earned by the labor of one spouse during
marriage would be treated as community property under accepted com-
munity property principles.
8. Though Francis raises both issues, this note examines preemption of property interests, rather
than of awards of alimony or support. There has been comparatively little difficulty with the latter.
Most courts have found that ERISA does not preempt state domestic relations law providing for child
support or maintenance; thus, private pension benefits are generally alienable for these limited pur-
poses. See note 72 infra.
Constitutional issues will be identified, but are not the focus of this note. See note 56 infra.
9. See, e.g., Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 924-25 (N.D. Cal.), appeal docketed, No.
78-2313 (9th Cir. June 21, 1978) (noting the "heavy presumption that Congress does not interfere
with the workings of state domestic relations law"). See also Reppy, Community and Separate Inter-
ests in Pensions and Social Security Benefits after Marriage of Brown and ERISA, 25 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 417, 483 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Reppy, Community and Separate Interests]; text accompa-
nying note 45 infra (discussion of Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950)) and note 47 infra (dis-
cussion of Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979)).
10. "Mhe marital property relationship in the community property system may be regarded as a
type of partnership... [where] each spouse is regarded as contributing equally to and sharing equally
in the economic well-being of the marital enterprise." Cross, The Community Property Law in
Washington, 49 WSH. L. REv. 729, 733-34 (1974).
Equality is the cardinal precept of the community property system. At the foundation of this
concept is the principle that all wealth acquired by the joint efforts of the husband and wife shall
be common property; the theory of the law being that, with respect to marital property acquisi-
tions, the marriage is a community of which [each] spouse is a member, equally contributing by
his or her industry to its prosperity, and possessing an equal right to succeed to the property after
its dissolution.
Id. at 734 n. 8.
Similarly, in common law property states, the more modem view of marriage recognizes the insti-
tution as a partnership between co-equals where each is equally entitled to the property accumulated
during the marriage. Foster & Freed, Marital Property and the Chancellor's Foot, 10 FAM. L. Q. 55,
57 (1976). Indeed, most states allow an equitable distribution of marital and separate property. See
ERISA: Community Property Law
B. Purpose of ERISA
Congress enacted ERISA to provide uniform national regulation of em-
ployee benefit plans because of the great increase over the past 30 years in
pension plans, which often "were inadequate, mismanaged and promised
benefits that proved to be illusory." "1 The Act seeks to protect employ-
ees and their "dependents" and "beneficiaries," although it uses the lat-
ter two terms rather indiscriminately. 12
Uniform regulation of plans provided the means of ensuring retirement
security. 13 To guarantee proper administration and management of bene-
fit plans, ERISA provides national standards for vesting, funding, reinsur-
ance, portability, fiduciary responsibility, and disclosure. 14 The early
drafts of ERISA indicate that state law was intended to be superseded
only to the extent that it interfered with this-elaborate scheme of federal
regulation. 15 Thus the House proposal would have expressly preempted a
note 57 infra. "It is fair, to conclude that criteria for property distribution, and to a lesser extent
alimony, has been 'non-fault' oriented, and the current emphasis is upon economic factors and the
trend is toward an approach analogous to the dissolution of a partnership." Freed & Foster, Eco-
nomic Effects ofDivorce, 7 FAM. L. Q. 275, 277 (1973).
11. In re Marriage of Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362, 366 (1979), appeal
dismissed, 40 S. CT. BuLL. (CCH) at B411 (Jan. 14, 1980).
12. The Congress finds . . . that the continued well-being and security of millions of
employees and their dependents are directly affected by these plans;... that despite the enor-
mous growth in such plans many employees with long years of employment are losing antici-
pated retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans; that owing to the
inadequacy of current minimum standards, the soundness and stability of plans with respect to
adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered; that owing to the termination of
plans before requisite funds have been accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have
been deprived of anticipated benefits; and that it is therefore desirable in the interests of employ-
ees and their beneficiaries... that minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable char-
acter of such plans and their financial soundness.
29 U.S.C. § 1001 (19761 ("Congressional findings and declaration of policy").
13. See e.g., Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 926 (N.D. Cal) appeal docketed. No. 78-2313
(9th Cir. June 21, 1978): In re Marriage of Johnston, 85 Cal. App. 3d 900, 149 Cal. Rptr. 798, 802
(1978), cert. denied sub nom. Southern Cal. Pension Plan v. Johnston, 40 S. CT. Bu.L (CCH) B417
(Jan. 14, 1980.
The House Committee on Education and Labor in endorsing its own comprehensive private pen-
sion reform program stated: "Its most important purpose will be to assure American workers that
they may look forward, with anticipation, to a retirement with financial security and dignity, and
without fear that this period of life will be lacking in the necessities to sustain them as human beings
within our society." H.R. RaP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4639, 4646.
The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare framed the basic issue as follows: "[W]hether
American working men and women shall receive private pension plan benefits which they have been
led to believe would be theirs upon retirement from working lives." S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4838,4838.
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1114 (1976).
15. The House version of ERISA specified that the scope of preemption included laws of the
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field consisting of reporting, disclosure and fiduciary responsibilities,
forfeitability, financing, portability, and insurance 6; the Senate proposal
would have preempted the "subject matters regulated by this Act' 7
which upon examination of committee reports were similar in scope to the
explicit list in the House proposal. 18 Concern in both houses thus focused
on uniformity in regulation of "administration, organization and struc-
ture" 19 of employee benefit plans. The final wording of the Act's
preemption provision reads: "[T]he provisions of this subchapter and
subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws inso-
far as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan .... ,20
II. THE FRANCIS DECISION
The Francis court relied upon the literal wording of the Act's preemp-
tion provision for its finding that ERISA preempts community property
characterization of ERISA benefits. 21 Citing other decisions which pro-
states relating "to the reporting and disclosure responsibilities and fiduciary responsibilities" and "to
the nonforfeitability of participant's benefits .... the adequacy of financing .. . . portability re-
quirements . . . .or the insurance of pension benefits." H.R. 2, 93d Cong.. 2d Sess., 120 CONG
REC. 4742 (1974).
The final Senate proposal ambiguously stated the intent to expressly preempt state laws that "relate
to the subject matters regulated by this Act." Id. at 5002. An examination of the committee reports
and early drafts, however, indicates that the Senate version was intended to parallel that of the House.
The Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare stated that "'Ithe purpose of
[Senate Bill 4] is to prescribe legislative remedies for the various deficiencies existing in the private
pension plan systems," listing such remedies as "standards of vesting, funding, reinsurance, disclo-
sure and fiduciary standards, and a voluntary program of portability of vested pension credits." S.
REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE CONG & AD Nrws 4838.
The Committee noted that the
problems in the private pension field . . . are so interrelated that they cannot be resolved
without a comprehensive legislative program, dealing not only with malfeasance and malad-
ministration in the plans, or the consequences of lack of adequate vesting, but also with the
broad spectrum of questions such as adequacy of funding, plant shut-downs and plan termina-
tions, transferability of vested credits, adequate communication to participants, and, in short,
the establishment of certain minimum standards to which all private pension plans must con-
form if the private pension promise is to become a reality rather than an illusion.
Id. at 4851.
The Committee report explained that the Senate bill provided "that this Act supersedes state laws
covering the same matters." Id. at 4883 (emphasis added). The Senate's intent therefore was in
harmony with the more explicit language used by the House.
16. See note 15 supra.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Comment, Preemption of California Community Property Law by ERISA: Congression-
al Intent and Judicial Interpretation, 10 PAc. L.J. 881,885-86 (1979).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1976).
21. 458 F. Supp. at 85-86.
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claimed ERISA's broad preemption of the employee benefit field,22 the
court concluded: "This language was intended to effect the broadest pos-
sible preemption of state law. The inclusion of all state laws which 'relate
to' any ERISA plan was an attempt to make this preemption cover laws
which were not specifically directed at this subject area, but which still
affected it." 23
The Francis court then found that an award to the wife of a community
interest in the benefits would constitute an impermissible alienation under
ERISA's spendthrift provision which prohibits assignment or alienation
of benefits. 24 The court claimed support from the Supreme Court's
decision in Wissner v. Wissner,25 which held that provisions for benefici-
ary designation in the National Service Life Insurance Act26 preempted a
spousal community property interest in insurance benefits under that Act.
III. ERISA'S GENERAL PREEMPTION PROVISION
Clearly, ERISA preempted a broad field in the areas of administration,
organization, and structure of employee benefit plans, 27 and any state law
within that field is therefore precluded by the supremacy clause. 28 The
pertinent issue, then, is the scope of the field occupied by ERISA, which
in turn depends on Congress' purpose in enacting it.
ERISA's general preemption provision mandates that ERISA su-
persedes any state law "relat[ing] to" any employee benefit plan.2 9 Al-
though the Francis court applied this provision in a literal sense,
numerous attempts to determine the scope of the language "relate to"
have resulted in little consensus. 30 One commentator suggested that only
22. See notes 43-44 infra.
23. 458 F. Supp. at 86 (emphasis added).
24. Id.
25. 338 U.S. 655 (1950). See note 46 and text accompanying notes 45-46, and 65-67 infra.
26. 38 U.S.C. §§ 701-729 (1976).
27. See notes 14-20 and accompanying text supra. See also Comment, ERISA and the Preemp-
tion of State Law, 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 599 (1978).
28. U.S. CONsr. art. VI, § 2. "Occupation of the field" occurs wherever Congress expresses the
intent to do so in the exercise of its constitutional powers. In this situation all state law in the field is
invalid, regardless of its compatibility with the federal regulaton. See L. TRIBE, AMERicAN CoNsTrrr-
-noNAL LAw § 6-25 at 384-85 (1978). Preemption also occurs where the state law conflicts with the
express terms of the federal enactment or frustrates congressional objectives. Id. § 6-24 at 377-84.
See Part IV infra. See generally, Morris, Constitutional Preemption of State Laws Against Massive
Oil Spills, I U. Puter SoUND L. REv. 73, 83-97 (1977).
29. The general preemptive clause is quoted in text accompanying note 20 supra. "The term
'employee benefit plan' or 'plan' means an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension
benefit plan or a plan which is both .... 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1976).
30. Comment, supra note 27, at 599; H.R. RaP. 1785, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 38, 47 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Task Force Report].
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state laws that relate to the "terms and conditions" of employee benefit
plans are preempted. 31 The Joint Pension Task Force, 32 however, rejected
such an interpretation as too narrow. 33
There are inherent practical limitations on the scope of ERISA's
preemption. A literal reading of the preemption clause would invalidate
substantial areas of state law with which Congress displayed no apparent
intention of tampering. Reading the preemption clause to invalidate state
law which only tangentially affects or relates to an ERISA-covered plan
would lead to incongruous consequences. 34 Recognizing such dangers,
courts have determined that ERISA does not preempt state fair employ-
ment laws. 35 Furthermore, if all related state law were precluded, the fed-
31. Reppy, Community and Separate Interests, supra note 9, at 515-16.
32. The Joint Pension Task Force was established pursuant to ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1221 (1976).
The Act required the Task Force to "make a full study and review of ... (4) the effects and desirabil-
ity of the Federal preemption of State and local law with respect to matters relating to pension and
similar plans" by September 2, 1976. 29 U.S.C. § 1222 (1976). Though it followed the enactment of
ERISA, this report is strong evidence of legislative intent. See Sioux Tribe v. United States, 316 U.S.
317, 329-30 (1942) (Congressional statements explaining or interpreting a statute which follows the
statute's enactment may nevertheless be "virtually conclusive" on legislative intent).
33. The Task Force Report concluded: "[T]he legislative scheme of ERISA is sufficiently broad
to leave no room for effective state regulation within the field preempted. Similarly it is our belief
that the Federal interest and the need for national uniformity are so great that enforcement of state
regulation should be precluded." Task Force Report, supra note 30, at 47.
34. As one commentator notes:
Huge chunks of state law would be displaced, resulting in the creation of a vacuum which
would have to be filled by the tedious and unending task of fashioning a federal common law
rule to answer all questions "relat[ing]," however remotely, to employee benefit plans. For
example, if it were contended that an employee was insane or otherwise lacked capacity to con-
tract when he signed up as a participant in the plan or made elections under it for certain optional
benefits, state laws on insanity and capacity to contract would, if utilized to solve the question,
"relate to" the plan.
An employer's discharging a participant employee for cause would most certainly "relate to"
the plan by causing discontinuance of the employee's participation (except as to already vested
rights). The very broad reading of "relate[s] to" could preempt almost the entire California
Labor Code, requiring a federal common law to be created to replace it. Does Congress intend
the federal courts to write a new federal common law of employment contracts and labor law for
ERISA covered employees?
Reppy, Community and Separate Interests, supra note 9, at 514-15.
35. A Wisconsin court, in Time Ins. Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 46
U.S.L.W. 2369 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1978), found that the Wisconsin fair employment law, which prohi-
bits employment practices that discriminate on the basis of sex, barred an employer's disability plan
that pays benefits to employees who are temporarily unable to work due to medical disabilities unless
the disability was due to pregnancy. The court noted:
There is more merit to the claim of federal preemption by reason of ERISA .... The Wisconsin
law, however, is not a state law dealing with some particular aspect of private employee benefit
plans, but is a statute broad in scope grounded on the state's police power to prevent employers
from engaging in employment practices that discriminate because of sex. This statute in no way
impinges on federal regulation of employee benefit and pension plans. The sex discrimination
prohibitions are merely a peripheral concern of ERISA.
Id. at 2370.
448
ERISA: Community Property Law
eral courts would need to create a substantial body of federal common
law, which might often amount to adopting the preempted state law. 36
The latest legislative interpretation of the general preemption provision
emerged in the Task Force Report. 37 While emphasizing ERISA's broad
preemptive effect, the Task Force Report, without directing itself specifi-
cally to the question of community property law, provides a standard that
would exclude community property law from ERISA's sweep. That stan-
dard includes in the field preempted only state law "which relates to em-
ployee benefit plans, qua benefit plans, ' ' 38 or, phrased differently, state
law "undertaken to regulate employee benefit plans as such.', 39 The test
thus is whether the state intended to regulate plans covered by ERISA or
whether the purposes of the state regulation were similar to those of
ERISA. Applying this test, state community property law, which does
not purport to regulate employee benefit plans as such, should be exempt.
The general tenor of the Task Force Report reinforces the conclusion
that community property law lies outside the field preempted. Neither the
Report nor any of ERISA's legislative history indicates that Congress in-
tended community property to be within that field. 40 Rather, the Task
Force Report focused on state law which intentionally and manifestly reg-
ulates ERISA plans.41
An Oregon court of appeals held that ERISA did not supersede a similar Oregon fair employment
law which defined sex discrimination to include employee benefit plans that discriminate against
those with pregnancy-based disabilities. Gast v. Oregon, 5 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2010 (Ore. Ct. App.
1978). That court explained:
The full import of this argument is that the states are precluded from regulating any matters that
relate to employer or employee organizations' provision of medical, disability, or death bene-
fits, vacation benefits, apprenticeship or training programs, day-care centers, scholarship funds,
prepaid legal insurance, retirement income, or deferred income.... The Statutory purposes are
to require disclosure and reporting to beneficiaries, to insure that employee pension benefit pro-
grams are adequately funded, to improve the equities of pension plans, and to establish mini-
mum standards assuring financial soundness of such plans. With respect to employee welfare
benefit plans . . .Congress confined federal regulation to establishing minimum standards for
disclosure and fiduciary responsibility.
... Significantly, there is no indication in any of the legislative history of an intent to preempt
areas of state regulation that are not addressed by ERISA, nor an intent that such areas be left
wholly unregulated.
Id. at 2010-11.
36. For example in Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316
(N.D. Ind. 1977), the court held that ERISA preempted state law which provided that health cover-
age of an employee's disabled dependent could not end at a certain age. Consequently the employee's
quadraplegic son obtained no relief under state law. Nevertheless, the court went on to fashion a
federal common law remedy, adopting the essentials of the preempted state law.
37. See note 32 supra.
38. Task Force Report, supra note 30, at 48.
39. Id. at 46.
40. See [1976] CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE, supra note 1, passim.
41. A number of states had undertaken to regulate employee benefit plans as such; others had
449
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Francis inappropriately cited cases unrelated to community property
law to support its finding of preemption. 42 For example, Hewlett-Packard
Co. v. Barnes 43 concluded that ERISA preempted the California Knox-
Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975 because the state act at-
tempted to regulate matters of administration of health care programs
which were clearly within the field occupied by ERISA." The commu-
nity property law preempted in Francis, however, is not the type of state
regulatory action which will hinder Congress' goal of uniform national
regulation over private employee benefit plans. Francis also cited Wiss-
ner v. Wissner,45 which involved the National Service Life Insurance
Act, as another case where the operation of state community property law
was found to frustrate Congress' purpose of ensuring uniform regulation.
Wissner, however, is distinguishable from Francis because the Wissner
court found that Congress had spoken with "force and clarity" in speci-
fying the preemptive effect of the National Service Life Insurance Act;46
similarly clear language cannot be found in ERISA.
already made, or appeared ready to declare, these plans subject to state control as insurers, trust
companies, or investment companies. From a drafting standpoint the difficulty arose in attempt-
ing to extricate these plans from the framework of state insurance, trust and securities regulation
even though their activities might very well bring them within the sphere of conduct historically
subject to such regulation. On the one hand it was clear that the plans subject to ERISA needed
to be freed of the possibility of state regulation; on the other, it was important to limit the effects
of preemption, in order to avoid disrupting state efforts to regulate the conduct of other financial
entities not subject to the federal Act.
Task Force Report, supra note 30, at 46.
42. 458 F. Supp. at 86.
43. 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd mem., 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
44. In Hewlett-Packard Co., the corporate plaintiffs managed employee health benefit plans
which the defendent, Commissioner of Corporations of the State of California, admitted were within
the regulatory scope of ERISA as well as the California Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of
1975, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1340-1395.5 (West Supp. 1977). Plaintiffs sought to enjoin
defendant from requiring compliance with the Knox-Keene Act which regulated such areas as fund-
ing, disclosure and licensing of health care programs. Defendant denied that ERISA preempted the
state Act, because there was insufficient evidence of congressional intent to preempt state regulation
of health plans. Granting judgment for plaintiffs, the court concluded, in language later adopted by
Francis, "that Congress both comprehended the change and intended the statute to occupy the entire
field of employee benefit plan regulation." 425 F. Supp. at 1299. Thus, in Hewlett-Packard Co.,
state law intentionally and manifestly competed with ERISA.
Francis also cited Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977).
Although the Bell court concluded that the defendant association was not within the scope of ERISA
because its major medical and death benefit plans were essentially those of an ordinary insurance
company and were not established by "employers" or "employee organizations," the court, in
dicta, adhered to the broad preemption doctrine that ERISA had occupied the field of employee bene-
fit plan regulation. 437 F. Supp. at 86.
45. 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
46. 338 U.S. at 658. In Wissner, the deceased had purchased life insurance as a serviceman un-
der the National Service Life Insurance Act, designating his mother as sole beneficiary. After his
450
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The United States Supreme Court held in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo47
that the Railroad Retirement Act 48 preempted any recognition of a
spouse's community property interest in pension benefits created by that
Act, but emphasized the deference typically accorded state domestic rela-
tions law. Reiterating preemption guidelines found in prior cases, 49 the
Court stated that preemption will be found only if Congress "has 'posi-
tively required by direct enactment' that state law be preempted .... A
mere conflict in words is not sufficient. State family and family-property
law must do 'major damage' to 'clear and substantial' federal interests" 50
before preemption will be found. The standard used by the Court was
"whether the right as asserted conflicts with the express terms of federal
law and whether its consequences sufficiently injure the objectives of the
federal program to require nonrecognition. "51
Although there are major differences between the Railroad Retirement
Act and ERISA, 52 the Hisquierdo standard is applicable wherever federal
death, the widow sued to collect her alleged one-half interest in the policy because the premiums had
been paid with community funds (his army pay). The Court held for the mother, stating that the Act
specified that the insured " 'shall have the right to designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the
insurance (within a designated class), . . . and shall . . . at all times have the right to change the
beneficiary or beneficiaries. . . .' 38 U.S.C. § 802(g). Thus Congress has spoken with force and
clarity in directing that the proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no other." Id.
47. 439 U.S. 572 (1979). The Court in a seven-to-two decision, held that retirement benefits
under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 could not be considered community property in a Califor-
nia divorce action. The Hisquierdo ruling is likely to influence future decisions concerning ERISA's
preemptive effect on community property law.
48. 45 U.S.C. § 231-231t (1976).
49. The most recent case cited by the Court was United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966), in
which the defendant and her husband had defaulted on a federal loan from the Small Business Admin-
istration (SBA). The SBA sued to recover out of defendant's separate property. Under Texas cover-
ture law, however, the wife had no capacity to bind herself by contract unless she obtained a court
decree removing the disability. Since she had not done so, the contract could not be enforced unless
the federal interest required preemption of state law. The Court decided it did not and found for the
defendant. The Court held that family property law "should be overridden by the federal courts only
where clear and substantial interests of the National Government, which cannot be served
consistently with respect for such state interest, will suffer major damage if the state law is applied."
Id. at 352.
Hisquierdo cited several cases demonstrating the federal interests necessary to override community
property law: Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) (rights of survivorship in U.S. savings bonds pur-
chased with community property to supersede Texas community property law because the recogni-
tion of such rights was viewed as an integral feature of marketing the bonds in the exercise of federal
power to borrow money); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 665 (1950); McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382
(1905) (lands owned by federal government were deemed to pass under the federal homestead law
rather than by state law of descent and distribution).
50. 439 U.S. at 581 (quoting Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904) and United States v.
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)).
51. Id. at 583.
52. In a footnote, the Hisquierdo Court acknowledged differences between the two federal statu-
tory schemes and specified that a decision of preemption in that case had no implications for any
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regulatory schemes confront state community property law. 53 Under this
standard it is doubtful that ERISA reflects preemptive intent sufficient to
overcome the presumption of validity of state community property law.
First, the express terms of ERISA do not conflict with the non-employee
spouse's claim. Second, recognition of this claim would not in any way
harm the objectives of ERISA. Congress' purpose was to ensure worker
retirement security, 54 but Congress has shown no intent to ensure the
worker's security to the exclusion of the spouse's.55 Its concern was
whether the retirement benefits would be available for personal use and
not whether the user would be the husband or wife. The finding of
preemption in Francis not only deprives the plaintiff individually of a
property interest in a manner raising serious constitutional issues,5 6 but
future decision regarding the effect of ERISA on state community property law, 439 U.S. at 590
n.24.
The Hisquierdo Court found that the Railroad Retirement Act benefits were essentially a federal
entitlement: "Congress may alter, and even eliminate, them at any time." Id. at 575. "Railroad
Retirement Act benefits from their very inception have federal overtones. Compulsory federal taxes
finance them and not just the taxes that fall on the employee." Id. at 582. ERISA, on the other hand,
regulates the management and administration of private pension plans to ensure future security for
employees and their dependents. Private pensions are contractual. The federal interest in the two
types of pensions is considerably different.
In enacting the Railroad Retirement Act, Congress expressly dealt with a number of competing
interests and possible beneficiaries. Congress modified the Railroad Retirement Act in 1975, specifi-
cally exempting child support and alimony obligations from the spendthrift clause, id. at 575-76; 42
U.S.C. § 659 (1978), and again in 1977, dictating that divisions of property between spouses were
not within this exemption. 42 U.S.C. § 662(c) (1978). Moreover, the Railroad Retirement Act spe-
cifically anticipated the possibility of divorce: "The entitlement of a spouse of an individual to an
annuity ... shall end on the last day of the month preceding the month in which ... the spouse and
the individual are absolutely divorced .. " 45 U.S.C. § 231d(c)(3) (Supp. 1979). The Hisquierdo
court concluded that a finding of preemption was required because Congress had made express
decision regarding the allocation of the finite funds. 439 U.S. at 585. ERISA, by contrast, is silent on
all of the above points.
53. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
54. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
55. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
56. Some commentators have suggested that depriving the non-employee spouse of a property
interest by the preemptive effect of ERISA, as in Francis, may violate due process. See, e.g., Reppy,
Community and Separate Interests, supra note 9, at 513, 524-26.
Two major Supreme Court cases interpreting broad national regulatory schemes provide support
for the preemption of community property and domestic relations law. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S.
655 (1950) (see text accompanying notes 45-46 supra); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572
(1979) (see text accompanying notes 47-52 supra).
The Wissner court noted that the National Service Life Insurance Act: (a) involved the war powers
of Congress, 338 U.S. at 660; (b) provided for very low premiums, with administration costs bome
by the federal government and liabilities discharged out of congressional appropriations, id. at 658;
and (c) specified both that the insured shall have the right to designate the beneficiary and that no
person shall have a vested right to the proceeds. Id. at 661. For these reasons, the Court concluded no
constitutional question of due process was presented.
The Hisquierdo Court decided that the annuity provided for by the Railroad Retirement Act more
452
ERISA: Community Property Law
also threatens a regression in domestic relations and community property
law generally. 57
IV. THE SPENDTHRIFr PROVISION
The spendthrift provision of ERISA requires that "[e]ach pension plan
shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or
alienated." 58 This provision should not be construed as presenting a con-
flict between state community property law and federal law59 because it is
too narrowly drawn to prevent a non-employee spouse from becoming an
owner of a community property interest in the benefits. The fundamental
closely resembled social security benefits than private pension benefits; hence the annuity is not con-
tractual but only a federal entitlement. Id. at 575. The constitutional issue was never raised. One
commentator argues strongly that the Hisquierdo result is unconstitutional. See Reppy, Learning to
Live with Hisquierdo, 6 COMMUNrrY PROP. J. 5, 14-16 (1979)[hereinafter cited as Reppy, Hisqui-
erdo].
57. See note 10 supra. State courts and legislatures have sought to recognize the contribution of
the non-employee spouse to the marital assets in community property states and in an increasing num-
ber of common law property states. "[S]ome 37 common-law property states by statute or decision
permit an equitable distribution of marital and separate property upon divorce." Foster & Freed,
Spousal Rights in Retirement and Pension Benefits, 16 J. FAM. L. 187, 191 n. 17 (1978). An increas-
ing number of these states recognize a spousal claim to retirement benefits. Id. Divestment by the
courts of the non-employee spouse's interest in a pension plan defeats this approach.
The argument that maintenance obligations are an adequate substitute for the community property
interest of the non-employee spouse is faulty. First, the modem purpose of maintenance is to support
the former spouse only until he or she can become economically self-sustaining. Courts view mainte-
nance as a transitional arrangement, not a permanent one. For example, in Washington a primary
factor considered by the court in fashioning an order of maintenance is "[t]he time necessary to
acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find employment
appropriate to his skill, interests, style of life, and other attendant circumstances." WASH. REv. CODE
§ 26.09.090(1)(b) (1979). Furthermore, an award of maintenance cannot be transmitted by will or
intestacy. Lastly, maintenance obligations may be difficult to collect; arrearages are often reduced or
ignored. See Foster & Freed, supra, at 189; Glendon, Is There a Future for Separate Property?, 8
FAM. L.Q. 315,316 (1974).
In addition, in Washington maintenance awards are subject to modification upon a showing of a
substantial change of circumstances, while any property disposition pursuant to a divorce decree may
be changed only upon a showing of circumstances such as fraud, which would justify the reopening
of a judgment in any other case. WASH. Rav. CooE § 26.09.170 (1979).
The policies underlying no-fault divorce also militate against denying the non-employee spouse's
interest in retirement income. Only Illinois, Pennsylvania, and.South Dakota still require some show-
ing of fault to grant divorce. Note, Are Fault Requirements in Divorce Actions Unconstitutional?, 16
J. F~t. L. 265 (1978). The basic premise of no-fault dissolution is that the marital partners should be
able to separate without the need of determining blameworthiness. A decision to end a marriage
should be made free from the pressure created by the undue economic dependence of one spouse.
Certainly a perceived federal inconvenience in administering ERISA should not control domestic re-
lations policy by creating such economic inequality.
58. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1975).
59. See note 23 supra regarding the two bases of preemption: supersession by conflict and super-
session by preclusion (occupation of the field). The latter is discussed with regard to ERISA's general
preemption provision in text accompanying note 28 supra.
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legal premise of community property is that each spouse acquires an
equal interest in all property acquired during the marriage by the labor of
either one; thus, the non-employee spouse acquires ownership rights in
the same fashion as does the employee. 60 Since the non-employee spouse
acquires ownership directly, there is no alienation or assignment between
the spouses. Under this reasoning, ERISA's prohibition of assignment or
alienation is irrelevant to the non-employee spouse's ownership interest.
This conclusion is supported by Stone v. Stone,61 where a judge of the
same federal court that decided Francis had earlier ruled that recognition
of the spouse's interest was not prohibited by ERISA's spendthrift provi-
sion. 62 Nevertheless, the Francis court disagreed and found the "trans-
fer" of pension benefits under the operation of state community property
law to be the kind of transfer expressly prohibited by the spendthrift
clause. Another court concluded that the ERISA prohibition could apply
only where the transferee was a creditor, and noted that the non-employee
spouse was, in fact, an owner. 63 The distinction between owner and
creditor is one which Francis ignored. 64
60. See note 10 supra.
61. 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
62. See id. at 926 (Renfrew, J.). ERISA's spendthrift provision "does not explicitly prohibit the
transfer of pension benefits under state community property laws, and the plain meaning of the terms
assignment or alienation does not include such a transfer." Id.
It should be noted that Judge Renfrew, who wrote the Stone decision, also wrote Hewlett-Packard.
so heavily relied upon in Judge Poole's finding of preemption in Francis. See notes 43-44 and ac-
companying text supra.
63. In Johns v. Retirement Fund, 85 Cal. App. 3d 511, 149 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1978). cert. denied.
40 S. CT. BULL. (CCH) B411 (Jan. 14, 1980), the California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, held
that ERISA "does not preempt California law as applied here in matrimonial matters .... The
spendthrift features of ERISA are not applicable because [the wife] is an owner, not a creditor." Id.
at 513, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 551-52 (citations omitted). See Thiede, The Community Property Interest of
Non-Employee Spouse in Private Employee Retirement Benefits, 9 U.S.F.L. REv. 635,650 (1975).
64. Only if the non-employee spouse is characterized as a creditor and not as an owner will the
spousal claim constitute an assignment or alienation. No reported case has held that following a prop-
erty settlement the former spouse has a claim for the pension benefits as creditor. The courts in Stone
v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), and Johns v. Retirement Fund, 85 Cal. App. 3d 511,
149 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1978), cert. denied, 40 S. CT. BULL. (CCH) B411 (Jan. 14, 1980), however, did
hold that the non-employee spouse holds a valid claim as an owner of a community property interest.
Accord, In re Marriage of Campa. 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1978), appeal dis-
missed, 40 S. CT. BULL. (CCH) B411 (Jan. 14, 1980); In re Marriage of Johnston, 85 Cal. App. 3d
900, 149 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1978), cert. denied sub. nom. Southern Cal. Pension Plan v. Johnston, 40
S. CT. BULL. (CCH) B417 (Jan. 14, 1980).
Nonetheless, Francis cited Kerbow v. Kerbow, 421 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Tex. 1976), deciding
companion cases in which a woman sought to enforce a claim against her former husband's pension
plan. The prior divorce decree in Kerbow, as part of the property settlement, had awarded the wife
$1,400 cash in the form of debt in lieu of pension benefits due to the husband. In Richardson v.
Richardson, the companion case, the prior divorce decree had awarded the wife a 40% interest in the
husband's retirement pension. The Francis court cited Kerbow, which presented a creditor situation,
ERISA: Community Property Law
Only on rare occasions has the Supreme Court found that a spendthrift
provision in a broad national statutory scheme requires preemption of
state community property and domestic relations law. In Wissner,65 the
Supreme Court found that the spendthrift provision in the National Ser-
vice Life Insurance Act demonstrated the requisite congressional intent to
preempt California community property law. 66 The preemption clause in
that Act, however, was far broader than ERISA's preemption clause.67 In
Hisquierdo,68 a spendthrift provision in the Railroad Retirement Act es-
sentially prohibited assignment, garnishment, attachment, or other legal
process, or anticipation of an annuity. 69 Over a strong dissent, 70 the His-
quierdo Court found the prohibition of attachment and anticipation7' to be
determinative of intent to preempt recognition of the spouse's community
as authority for the preemption of an ownership interest under community property law. Francis, 458
F. Supp. at 87.
65. 338 U.S. at 655. See note 46 supra.
66. The National Service Life Insurance Act then provided that payments to the named benefici-
ary "shall be exempt from the claims of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or
seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the
beneficiary .. " Wissner, 338 U.S. at 659 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 816).
67. ERISA's preemption clause prohibits only assignment and alienation. See text accompanying
note 58 supra.
68. 439 U.S. at 572.
69. The Railroad Retirement Act spendthrift clause states:
Notwithstanding any other law of the United States, or of any State, territory, or the District
of Columbia, no annuity or supplemental annuity shall be assignable or be subject to any tax or
to garnishment, attachment, or other legal process under any circumstances whatsoever, nor
shall the payment thereof be anticipated ... 
45 U.S.C. § 231m (Supp. 1979).
70. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, argued that the spendthrift clause (see note 69
supra) was irrelevant because the prohibition against garnishment and attachment relates to remedies,
not to the ownership interests asserted by the wife under community property law. Justice Stewart
stated that recognition of a community property interest does not constitute an assignment but only a
recognition of equal ownership between spouses. Finally, because no definition of anticipation is
found in the Act, the dissent concluded that the common law meaning of anticipation-trustees mak-
ing lump-sum payments inconsistent with specific periodic benefits-was intended. Thus the dissent
concluded that a prohibition against anticipation should not supersede community property law. His-
quierdo, 439 U.S. at 599-602.
71. Recent Treasury Department regulations have created a similar "no-anticipation" rule under
ERISA despite the fact that ERISA prohibits only assignment and alienation: "[A] trust will not be
qualified unless the plan of which the trust is a part provides that benefits provided under the plan
may not be anticipated .... 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13(b) (1978). Some commentators have merely
assumed the regulation is valid. See, e.g., Comment, Preemption of California Community Property
Law by ERISA: Congressional Intent and Judicial Interpretation, 10 PAc. L.J. 881, 887 (1979). If
the regulation is upheld its effect would be similar to that of the "no-anticipation" clause in Hisqui-
erdo. Professor Reppy believes that the effect of this regulation in Washington, one of the "fair and
equitable" distribution states, see text accompanying note 5 supra, would be to preclude the court
effecting a property distribution at divorce from even considering the existence of the pension.
Reppy, Hisquierdo, supra note 56, at 10-11. Any indication that the divorce court had reached a
particular distribution of property contemplating those benefits would be grounds for appeal.
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property interest, thereby implying that a prohibition against mere
assignment has no preemptive effect on community property law.
Moreover, prohibitions against alienation or assignment have not pre-
vented the courts from invading pension benefits for either maintenance
or support obligations arising out of dissolution. 72
V. THE IMPLIED EXCEPTION THEORY
Most cases73 and legal commentators 74 have rejected the Francis re-
sult. The proper legal theory for doing so, however, remains a compelling
question. The Department of Labor has argued that the Francis rationale
of preemption is correct, but that the result is nonetheless inappropriate
because there should be "an implied exception to the anti-assignment
provisions of ERISA" for recognition of community property interests. 75
The implied exception theory first surfaced in cases dealing with fam-
ily support obligations. When the issue arose whether ERISA pension
funds could be reached to pay family support obligations, courts consis-
tently held that the preemption provisions did not apply.76 The strong
public interest in having funds available for family support led to the judi-
cially-created "implied exception" to ERISA's preemption provisions.77
72. In American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979), the court held that
garnishment orders that enforce state-court-created family support obligations are impliedly excepted
from ERISA's anti-alienation provision and thus are not subject to preemption by ERISA. The obli-
gations involved included both alimony and child support. However, it is not clear to what extent this
implied exception rests upon lack of intent to preempt or upon public policy concepts unique to fam-
ily support obligations. See text accompanying notes 73-95 and 65-85 infra.
Indeed, the argument is much stronger that pensions should be exempt from child support and
maintenance obligations than that they should be exempt from community property interests. An
award for child support or maintenance is clearly an alienation, albeit an involuntary one; one strand
of the argument against preemption (expressed, for example, in Merry) is that even if such alienation
has occurred it is not intended to come within the "no-alienation" clause. A division of community
property, however, is simply not an alienation in the first place; the retiree never held an ownership
interest in the benefits which the non-employee claims.
73. See, e.g., Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal.), appeal docketed, No. 78-2313 (9th
Cir. June 21, 1978); In re Marriage of Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1979),
appeal dismissed, 40 S. CT. Buu.. (CCH) B411 (Jan. 14, 1980); In re Marriage of Johnston, 85 Cal.
App. 3d 900, 149 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1978) cert. denied sub nom. Southern Cal. Pension Plan v. John-
ston, 40 S. CT. BuLL. (CCH) B417 (Jan. 14, 1980); Johns v. Retirement Fund, 85 Cal. App. 3d 511,
149 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1978), cert. denied, 40 S. CT. Buu.. 4 (CCH) B411 (Jan. 14, 1980).
74. See, e.g., Reppy, Community and Separate Interests, supra note 9, at 527; Comment, supra
note 19, at 890-93.
75. Brief of the Secretary of Labor, Amicus Curiae, at 20, Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919,
(N.D. Cal), appeal docketed, No. 78-2313 (9th Cir. June 21, 1978). The Department of the Trea-
sury concurred in this assertion. Id. at 20 n. 16.
76. Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592
F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979); Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
77. See American Tel. & Tel. Co., 592 F.2d at 121-24.
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The Department of Labor would extend this exception to the Francis situ-
ation under the assertion that policy considerations involved in divisions
of community property are comparable to those in the family support
cases.
78
Cases involving family support obligations, however, are not an en-
tirely appropriate source for policy governing property interests. The
former is based on need; the latter derives from property rights. While the
courts strongly favor family obligations based on need, they generally
rely on legislative direction when adjudicating property rights. 79
Proponents of extending the implied exception theory to community
property interests cite Wissner for support, 80 but the Supreme Court there
only emphasized the greater judicial solicitude given to legislative order-
ing of property rights than is accorded to family support obligations. 81
Hisquierdo also purported to follow a specific Congressional mandate in
finding preemption of property rights.82 Thus the Court has implicitly re-
fused to adopt an equitable balancing approach in the context of property
rights. A court may adjudicate property rights in specific cases, but the
creation of the property rights themselves is the province of the legisla-
ture.8 3 If Francis was correct in finding preemption of community
property law because the operation of state law would cause, under the
Hisquierdo standard, "major damage to clear and substantial federal in-
terests," 84 courts will be loathe to find an implied exception for property
rights.
Stone v. Stone85 is the only case which has been cited as direct support
for the implied exception approach to the preemption of community prop-
erty law.86 The Stone court did not expressly adopt an implied exception
theory; it found that neither the "plain meaning" of the spendthrift provi-
sion87 nor the general preemption provision88 preempted community
78. Brief of the Secretary of Labor, supra note 75, at 22-26.
79. See note 83 and accompanying text infra.
80. See Brief of the Secretary of Labor, supra note 75, at 26; Comment, supra note 19, at
898-900.
81. 338 U.S. at 660 (1950).
82. See note 52 supra.
83. Refusing to alter what it considered legislative mandate, the Hisquierdo Court noted that
"[the judicial construction on which respondent relies is a child of equity, not of law." 439 U.S. at
586. "It is not the province of state courts to strike a balance different from the one Congress has
struck." Id. at 590.
84. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 581.
85. 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal.), appeal docketed, No. 78-2313 (9th Cir. June 21, 1978).
86. See Brief of the Secretary of Labor, supra note 75, at 25; Comment, supra note 19, at 898.
87. 450 F. Supp. at 926.
88. Id. at 932.
Washington Law Review
property law. However, the court may have impliedly adopted the ap-
proach, in response to practical considerations of fair distribution of mari-
tal estates. The Stone court found that a non-employee spouse in a com-
munity property state had an ownership interest in the employee spouse's
ERISA plan benefits. 89
The court recognized that unless there were an implied exception for
awards of pension benefits pursuant to a division of property in a common
law state, a non-employee spouse in a common law state would be placed
in a disadvantaged position relative to a community property spouse. 90
However, Congress probably never contemplated the variable of
community versus common law property states in drafting the preemption
provision. 91 Such neglect is not unknown. 92
Whatever inadequacies the implied exception approach may have in le-
gal theory, in practical terms it offers an attractive alternative. Not only
would it rectify the Francis result in a community property state, but it
would allow a common law property state to award a non-employee
spouse an interest in the pension under a "fair and equitable distribution"
statute. 93 The implied exception theory is also appealing to community
property states with quasi-community property, 94 where the employee
spouse's pension would become a community property asset. In these cir-
cumstances, the implied exception theory would support an award to the
non-employee spouse.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts in cases subsequent to Francis have refused to adopt the Fran-
cis approach. ERISA's general preemption clause should not supersede
state community property law because there is little reason to think that
89. Id. at 925.
90. Id. at 925-26. "If the characterization under state property law were dispositive, a spouse
entitled to a fair and equitable share of marital property in a non-community property state. could
not collect benefits if the law of that state did not recognize a pre-existing ownership interest as Cali-
fornia law does." Id.
91. Certain tax sections of ERISA mention community property states, 26 U.S.C. §§ 219,
402(e), 408 (1978), but there is nothing in the history of the spendthrift provision which mentions
community property law. See [1976] CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE, supra note 1, passim.
92. For example, because the original federal estate tax provisions made no distinction between
decedents of community property states and common law property states, the former were treated
more favorably. This inequity was remedied in 1948 by the adoption of the marital deduction. See
generally, R. STEPHENS, G. MAFiELD & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIur TAXATION 5 5.06 [1] (4th
ed. 1978).
93. See note 57 supra.
94. See Comment, supra note 71, at 896.
Quasi-community property exists only in California and Idaho, and consists of that property which
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Congress intended to preempt it, and because ERISA's purpose of ensur-
ing the viability of employee benefit plans is not impaired by the
operation of state community property rules. The Task Force Report indi-
cates ERISA preempts only state regulation of retirement plans qua plans.
Thus state law intended to regulate subject matter other than employee
benefit plans is outside the field even if it incidentally touches a plan.
Similarly, the spendthrift provision of ERISA should not be a basis for
a finding of preemption. The non-employee spouse takes possession of a
pre-existing ownership interest; no alienation or assignment is involved.
While the implied exception theory presents an attractive alternative to
the Francis decision in several practical ways, its doctrinal underpinnings
are weak.
Divestment of the non-employee spouse's ownership interest is also in-
defensible in light of the conditions of modem society. A realistic ap-
praisal of the increased divorce rate requires recognition of each spouse
both as part of a marital community and as an individual who may again
be faced with the difficulties of economic independence. 95 In terms of an
enlightened public policy there is simply no equitable rationale to permit
the denial of one spouse's property interest in favor of the other.
Donald L. Shanks
is acquired in another state as separate property and would have been community property if acquired
in California or Idaho. CAL. Cv. CODE §§ 4800(a), 4803 (West Supp. 1978); IDAHO CODE §§
15-2-201 to 15-2-209 (1979).
Arizona law embodies the concept of quasi-community property, labeling it simply community
property; Atuz. REv. STAT. Are. § 25-318 (West Supp. 1979-1980).
95. "For example inadequate attention has been given to the plight of elderly women, fifty per-
cent of whom have incomes under $1800 a year." Foster & Freed, supia note 57, at 190. Moreover,
it should be noted that "the divorce rate for the elderly has at least doubled during the recent divorce
epidemic." Id. at 190 n. 12 (figures for 1974).
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